In this personal injury action grounded in a theory of premises liability, the Appellate Division, First Department, affirmed the lower court’s award of summary judgment in favor of M&H’s client, finding as a matter of law that the subject staircase did not violate any provision of the NY City Building Code.
|Levine v 425 Madison Assoc.|
|2016 NY Slip Op 03111 [138 AD3d 606]|
|April 26, 2016|
|Appellate Division, First Department|
|Published by New York State Law Reporting Bureau pursuant to Judiciary Law § 431.|
|As corrected through Wednesday, June 1, 2016|
Decided on May 31, 2016
Friedman, J.P., Renwick, Moskowitz, Richter, Kapnick, JJ.
[*1] Stacey Levine et al., Appellants,
425 Madison Associates et al., Respondents.
Ressler & Ressler, New York (Ellen R. Werther of counsel), for appellants.
Mischel & Horn, P.C., New York (Scott T. Horn of counsel), for respondents.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Manuel J. Mendez, J.), entered December 24, 2014, which granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff Stacey Levine alleges that she slipped and fell while descending a marble staircase in a residential building owned and managed by defendants. On appeal, she does not challenge the dismissal of her common-law negligence claim based on the inherently slippery condition of the floor, which is not an actionable defect under the common law (Waiters v Northern Trust Co. of N.Y., 29 AD3d 325, 326-327 [1st Dept 2006]; Sarmiento v C & E Assoc., 40 AD3d 524, 527 [1st Dept 2007]). Rather, she asserts that the motion court erred in dismissing her statutory claims.
he motion court correctly dismissed the statutory claims. Although defendants failed to submit competent evidence showing the year the building was erected (see Powers v 31 E 31 LLC, 24 NY3d 84, 92-93 ), no version of the Building Code is implicated. Defendants have not violated any sections of the Building Code or Fire Code alleged by plaintiffs, since the staircase upon which the injured plaintiff allegedly fell was neither an “interior stair” within the meaning of the 1968 Building Code of the City of New York or predecessor Building Codes (Administrative Code of City of NY §§ 27-232, 27-375 [h]; see Cusumano v City of New York, 15 NY3d 319, 324 ; see also Maksuti v Best Italian Pizza, 27 AD3d 300 [1st Dept 2006], lv denied 7 NY3d 715 ), nor a “means of egress” within the meaning of the New York City Building Code and the New York City Fire Code (NY City Building Code [Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 28, ch 7] §§ BC 1002.1, 1003.4; NY City Fire Code [Administrative Code of City of NY, tit 29, ch 2] §§ FC 1001.1, 1001.2, 1002.1, 1027.1). Concur—Sweeny, J.P., Saxe, Moskowitz, Gische and Webber, JJ.